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1. Introduction
The notion of risk plays a central role in economics, ﬁnance, health, psychology, law and
elsewhere, and is prevalent in managing challenges and resources in day-to-day life. In
recent work, Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016) has argued against the orthodox probabilistic
conception of risk on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is determined by how proba-
ble it is, and in favour of a modal conception on which the risk of a hypothetical scenario is
determined by how modally close it is. In this article, we use Pritchard’s discussion as a
springboard for a more wide-ranging discussion of the notion of risk. We introduce three dif-
ferent conceptions of risk: the standard probabilistic conception, Pritchard’s modal concep-
tion, and a normalcy conception that is new (though it has some precursors in the
psychological literature on risk perception). Ultimately, we argue that the modal conception is
ill-suited to the roles that a notion of risk is required to play and explore the prospects for a
form of pluralism about risk, embracing both the probabilistic and the normalcy conceptions.
2. Stage setting: risk judgments
Our focus is on risk judgments of the following kind:
1 Given our evidence, the risk of a plane crash is very low.
2 Given our evidence, there’s a high risk of food poisoning at this restaurant.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1 The paper was jointly devised and written by Ebert and Smith. Survey design is due to Ebert, Smith, and
Durbach. Ebert and Durbach are responsible for survey recruitment and survey analysis.
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Often when we make a risk judgment, we would omit any mention of evidence and
simply say something like:
3 The risk of a plane crash is very low.
4 There’s a high risk of food poisoning at this restaurant.
We take the view that a risk judgment always implicates a body of evidence, which
we refer to as the background evidence. In cases where the background evidence is not
made explicit, we take it to be supplied by the context of utterance and, in typical cases,
to be the evidence possessed by the one making the judgment. That is, we are inclined
towards a contextualist semantics for utterances such as 3 and 4, on which their truth
conditions feature an evidence parameter, the value of which is ﬁxed by the context. The
semantics of such utterances is not, however, our primary concern here.
As well as making categorical risk judgments such as the above, we often make com-
parisons. While we may judge that the risk of a plane crash is very low, we may also
judge that there is a higher risk of a car crash on the way to the airport. As well as judg-
ing that there’s a high risk of food poisoning at a particular restaurant, we might also
judge that there is a lower risk of food poisoning at the restaurant next door.
Moreover, while we often speak about the riskiness of feared events, such as plane
crashes, food poisoning, etc., we can also assess the risk of states of affairs. For instance,
before drilling into the wall of a 1970s West Australian house, one might assess the risk
that the wall contains asbestos, or jurors in a criminal trial, when contemplating a guilty
verdict, might consider the risk that the defendant is innocent, or a mountaineer may pon-
der the risk that the snow conditions are unfavourable for a climb. Here, we treat propo-
sitions as the primary bearers of risk, with the riskiness of an event or state of affairs
corresponding to the riskiness of the proposition that the event occurs, or the state of
affairs obtains. As well as making judgments about the risk of speciﬁc events and states
of affairs, people also assess the risk of activities or decisions, saying things like ‘Drilling
into this wall is risky’, ‘It would be risky to attempt a climb under these conditions’.
These judgments are important to understanding the connections between risk and deci-
sion making but we put them to one side here.
3. The probabilistic account of risk
According to the probabilistic account of risk, the risk of a proposition P is determined
by the probability of P–the higher the probability, the higher the risk. On this view, the
risk of P is higher than the risk of Q just in case P is more probable than Q is. The prob-
ability here should be interpreted as evidential probability–probability conditional upon
the background evidence.
We follow Pritchard in treating the probabilistic account as the orthodox account of
risk (Pritchard, 2015, section 1). It is important to note, however, that this is somewhat
different to the deﬁnition of risk that has become standard in professional risk manage-
ment and in some economics textbooks. On this deﬁnition, risk is equated with expected
disvalue: the probability of an outcome multiplied by a measure of how severe or detri-
mental it would be. There is some evidence to suggest that this is best regarded as a
technical deﬁnition (and a relatively recent one) which doesn’t directly connect with our
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ordinary risk judgments (Boholm et.al. 2016).2 In any case, our focus here will be on risk
comparisons made in cases where severity is held constant and the two accounts of risk
generate the same predictions.
It is widely acknowledged that the intuitive risk judgments that people are inclined to
make don’t always align with what the probabilistic account would predict. In research
dating back to at least the 1970s psychologists have identiﬁed a range of ways in which
people’s intuitive judgments systematically deviate from what the probabilistic account
would sanction. These results have been treated not as evidence against the probabilistic
account but, rather, as revealing important heuristics and biases which guide our judg-
ments about risk and probability. For example, Kahneman & Tversky propose a number
of heuristics that underlie risk judgments, such as the availability and representation
heuristics, which in many cases lead to systematic deviations from what the probabilistic
account would predict to be correct (Kahneman & Tversky 1973, Tversky & Kahneman
1974; for an overview, see Kahneman 2011).
Under the inﬂuence of the dual process theory of reasoning (e.g. Epstein 1994, Slo-
man 1996, and many others; for an overview, see Evans 2011), more recent work has
emphasised the role that emotions play in risk judgments and highlighted the way in
which the determinants of cognitive risk judgments and emotive risk judgments are often
very different (Loewenstein, et.al. 2001, Finuncane et.al. 2000, Slovic, et.al. 2002, Slovic,
et.al. 2004). It has been suggested that:
“feelings about risk are largely insensitive to changes in probability, whereas cognitive
evaluations do take probability into account. As a result, feelings about risk and cognitive
risk perceptions often diverge, sometimes strikingly.” (Loewenstein, et.al. 2001, p.271)
Proponents of the ‘risk as feeling’ hypotheses adopt a dual system approach to risk judg-
ments whereby some risk judgments will be the output of a broadly cognitive system,
and predominantly determined by features such as estimated probabilities, while other
judgments will be generated by a more affective system, and inﬂuenced by the ease or
vividness with which the outcomes can be imagined, and by personal experience with
the relevant outcome (Loewenstein, et.al. 2001). That risk judgments can deviate from
the probabilistic norm is thus to be expected on a dual system approach.
In a series of recent articles, Pritchard (2015, 2016) has criticised the probabilistic
account of risk and argued in favour of an alternative that he terms the modal account.
Pritchard asks us to compare two cases in which the same bad outcome may occur in
two very different ways which are stipulated to have the same probability. Given these
stipulations, the probabilistic account predicts that the risk in the two scenarios ought to
be equal but, according to Pritchard, one scenario is “clearly far more risky than the
2 It’s clear that the severity of various possible outcomes is one factor governing judgments about the riski-
ness of activities or decisions. We think it is less clear that this factor is involved in ordinary judgments
about the risk of events or states of affairs. Think of two negative events that might occur during a plane
ﬂight: (i) the plane might crash, killing all on board, (ii) one might be seated next to an irritating person.
If risk is calculated as the product of probability and severity, it’s plausible that (i) ought to be regarded
as the higher risk event. Yet it would seem at best rather misleading to say “there is a greater risk of the
plane crashing than of me being seated next to an irritating person.” We won’t pursue this issue further
here.
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other” (Pritchard 2015, p. 441, our italics). Pritchard’s cases are as follows (adapted from
Pritchard 2015, p.441):
(Bomb 1) An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb, which he has hidden in a popu-
lated area. If the bomb explodes, many people will die. There is no way of discovering
the bomb before the time it is set to detonate. The bomb will only detonate, however, if
a set of six speciﬁc numbers between 1 and 49 come up on the next national lottery
draw. The odds of these numbers appearing is fourteen million to one. It is not possible
to interfere with this lottery draw.3
(Bomb 2) Same as above, however the bomb will only detonate if a series of three highly
unlikely events obtains. First, the weakest horse in the ﬁeld at the Grand National, Lucky
Loser, must win the race by at least ten furlongs. Second, the worst team remaining in
the FA Cup draw, Accrington Stanley, must beat the best team remaining, Manchester
United, by at least ten goals. And third, the Queen of England must spontaneously choose
to speak a complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech. The odds of this
chain of events occurring are fourteen million to one.
According to Pritchard, (Bomb 1) is riskier than (Bomb 2) and, if forced to choose, we
ought to prefer (Bomb 2) to (Bomb 1). We admit there may be some temptation to judge
as Pritchard does, but would be cautious in drawing any immediate conclusions about
the viability of the probabilistic account. Even if this judgment is widely shared (more
on this below), this would seem to put Pritchard’s example in the same category as other
existing examples in which risk judgments have been shown to deviate from what the
probabilistic account predicts. Nonetheless, Pritchard invests his thought experiment with
an added signiﬁcance: as putting pressure on the probabilistic account of risk, rather than
exposing a heuristic or bias which can affect our judgments.
A number of heuristics and biases that psychologists have identiﬁed could potentially
come into play in the kinds of cases Pritchard describes. One thing that we might observe
is that the conditions for triggering a detonation in (Bomb 1) seem far easier to imagine
than the conditions described in (Bomb 2). To imagine that the weakest horse in the
Grand National wins by at least 10 furlongs or that the worst team remaining in the FA
cup draw beats the best team remaining by at least 10 goals or that the Queen sponta-
neously chooses to speak a complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech
plausibly involves the construction of a rich accompanying narrative. In contrast, to
imagine six particular numbers coming up in the next National Lottery draw requires no
particular narrative. In a range of studies, psychologists have shown that there is a posi-
tive correlation between the ease with which an event can be imagined or recalled, and
how probable we estimate the event to be–a phenomenon variously labelled as the avail-
ability heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 1973, Tversky & Kahneman 1974) or the simula-
tion heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 1982).
Additionally, one might hypothesise that ease of imagining may exert an inﬂuence on
intuitive risk judgments even when probabilities are made explicit. That is, one might
hypothesise that the greater ease with which one can imagine the scenario as described in
3 We take it that Pritchard’s intent here is that the bomb would be triggered by the presence of 6 particular
numbers in the lottery draw, irrespective of their order. That is, taking order into account, there are 720
possible lottery outcomes that would serve to trigger the bomb. This, at any rate, is what gives us a prob-
ability close to the fourteen million to one ﬁgure.
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(Bomb 1) might lead one to assign it a higher risk than (Bomb 2) even though the proba-
bilities are stipulated to be equal.4
Further, according to the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky 1991), preference
to bet, when the relevant options are judged equally probable, can depend on how
knowledgeable and competent people take themselves to be with respect to the bets in
question. Heath & Tversky showed that sports fans prefer to take bets on sporting events
rather than on chance events, even when they judge the probabilities to be equal, since
success in the former would be attributable to one’s knowledge and competence as
opposed to mere luck. Given that (Bomb 1) is a scenario in which success or failure is
simply due to luck, someone who takes himself to be somewhat knowledgeable about
the conditions in (Bomb 2) may be expected to prefer that option. In the highly likely
event that a subject thereby succeeds in saving lives, that subject may expect to deserve
some credit.5
Another confounding factor is the plausible variation, across the two scenarios, of
one’s conﬁdence about the probability assignments in question. The probability of a lot-
tery outcome can be straightforwardly determined, given the properties of the lottery.
However, it is much less clear how to determine the probabilities of the triggering condi-
tions in (Bomb 2). Pritchard simply stipulates a value for the probability of an explosion
in (Bomb 2), but it is natural to take this as much more speculative and less certain than
the corresponding value in (Bomb 1).6 G€ardenfors & Sahlin (1982) and Goldsmith &
Sahlin (1983) highlight a number of ways in which preferences in an equiprobable choice
scenario are affected by differences in one’s conﬁdence about the probabilities. In a ﬁnd-
ing that is particularly signiﬁcant for the present discussion, Goldsmith and Sahlin
observe that when asked to choose between equiprobable bets under lose-or-not-lose con-
ditions (where only a neutral or adverse outcome is in prospect), some subjects prefer
bets where the probabilities are judged to be less certain. Such a mechanism offers
another possible explanation for a preference for (Bomb 2).7
Finally, some (including the authors) might well think that the stipulated probabilities
in (Bomb 2) are unreasonably high. The probability that the weakest horse in the Grand
National wins by at least 10 furlongs and the worst team remaining in the FA cup draw
4 Indeed, in cases with affect rich outcomes–and maybe the Bomb scenario is one such outcome–studies
show that subjects tend to give less weight to explicitly given probabilities when assessing the risk (Rot-
tenstreich & Hsee 2001).
5 These considerations nicely tie in with Pritchard’s observation that in Bomb 1 one would tensely await
the lottery results while in Bomb 2 there would be no similar cause for alarm. Compare our appendix for
further discussion of Heath & Tversky’s hypotheses in the context of our survey results.
6 Instead of drawing on higher-order conﬁdence, one may allude to Knight’s (Knight 1921) famous distinc-
tion between risk as measurable and uncertainty as non-measurable and observe that the ﬁrst scenario
involves a clearly identiﬁable risk, while the second scenario involves uncertainty. Also relevant here is
the well-known ambiguity paradox (Ellsberg 1961) which highlights that the way in which people experi-
ence uncertainty involves aspects that are not easily captured by the relevant probabilities. Further discus-
sion of this issue would lead us too far aﬁeld. However, see Einhorn & Hogarth (1985) who discuss the
interrelationship between Ellsberg’s insights and the issue of higher-order probabilities alluded to in the
main text.
7 Goldsmith & Sahlin (1983) also found that some subjects, rather than exhibiting a blanket preference for
less certain probabilities, exhibited a preference for less certain probabilities when the probability of loss
was high and a preference for more certain probabilities when the probability of loss was low. In the
bomb scenarios, where the probability of an adverse outcome is low, subjects who chose in accordance
with this pattern might be expected, all else equal, to prefer (Bomb 1).
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beats the best team remaining by at least 10 goals and the Queen spontaneously chooses
to speak a complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech might reasonably
be regarded to be far lower than the stipulated value of 1 in 14 million.8 Given a more
realistic estimate of this probability, the probabilistic account will straightforwardly pre-
dict that the risk in (Bomb 2) is lower than in (Bomb 1), offering another possible expla-
nation for the intuition.
These hypotheses are admittedly speculative, yet they offer potential ways of explain-
ing Pritchard’s judgment about the bomb scenario in a way that is compatible with the
probabilistic account of risk. In so far as Pritchard intends to challenge the probabilistic
account as a descriptively adequate theory of ordinary risk judgments, hypotheses of this
kind need to be considered. Moreover, as mentioned above, it is also crucial, in this con-
text, that Pritchard’s judgment is widely shared.
To investigate this further, we put together a short survey using the original vign-
ettes from Pritchard (2015). The details of our survey (recruitment, vignettes, results)
can be found in the appendix, which includes a more thorough discussion of the
results. However, to summarise the main ﬁndings: while the claim that people tend to
prefer (Bomb 2) over (Bomb 1) receives support from our survey, the claim that peo-
ple judge (Bomb 2) to be less risky is not supported, with the majority of subjects
judging that the risk of the bomb detonating, in the two scenarios, is equal (See
Figure 1).
These results don’t, on their own, show that Pritchard’s judgment about the bomb cases
is wrong, and don’t necessarily undermine his case against the probabilistic account. After
all, Pritchard could maintain that his premises don’t need to be supported by experimental
surveys. We won’t engage here in a wider debate about philosophical methodology.
Rather, more modestly, we think that what the survey results suggest is that, even in the
kinds of cases to which Pritchard draws attention, the probabilistic account offers a reason-
able, though far from perfect, prediction as to how people judge risk.9
Rather than relying upon judgments about particular examples, an alternative approach
to challenging the probabilistic account is to argue that this notion of risk fails to make
sense of certain pervasive patterns of reasoning. Consider what we call checklist reason-
ing about risk. It is often natural to assess the risk of an event or state of affairs by sepa-
rately assessing the risk of various possible ways in which it could occur or obtain. In
checklist reasoning, an event or state of affairs is judged to be low risk on the grounds
that every possible way in which it could happen is regarded as being low risk. Suppose
8 We were recently quoted 5000 to 1 odds for a bet on an outcome similar to Pritchard’s ﬁrst condition
(“Newport County to draw Man City in the FA Cup and beat them by at least 10 goals. We would be
happy to quote 5,000/1 for a maximum bet of £10.” email correspondence on 1/2/2018 with www.willia
mhill.co.uk). Additionally, other bookmakers refused to offer quotes on the second condition, with one
citing the “extremely improbable nature” of the event as a reason to not offer us any odds. So, assuming
similar odds for this bet, and assuming that the two conditions are independent, we already arrive at a 1
in 25 million probability for both conditions being met. If we assume the same probability for the third
condition and treat it as mutually independent of the other two, we derive a probability of 1 in
125,000,000,000 (1 in 125 billion) for the bomb actually exploding in (Bomb 2). We could, of course,
change the conditions in (Bomb 2), or supply a more realistic probability value and alter the lottery in
(Bomb 1) to restore the match in probabilities. It may be that these changes wouldn’t signiﬁcantly alter
people’s judgments about the cases–but we regard this as something of an open question, which is the
subject of further planned experimental work.
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
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you are concerned that you will be late for an important work meeting and I try to reas-
sure you as follows:
You’ve left enough time to get to work, so there are really only two ways in which you
could be late: if the car breaks down or you get stuck in a serious trafﬁc jam. The risk of
the car breaking down is low–the car is still relatively new and you’ve just had it ser-
viced. And the risk of you getting stuck in a trafﬁc jam is low too–it’s usually quiet on
the roads at this time, and there are no reports of trafﬁc problems. So, you needn’t worry,
the risk of you being late to work is low.
Formally, checklist reasoning involves the following inference pattern:
1 There is a low risk of P.
2 There is a low risk of Q.
3 There is a low risk of (P ∨ Q).
Not only is this an intuitive pattern, but in certain settings it may be that something
approaching this reasoning is formally prescribed. Checklist reasoning is implicated, for
instance, in the practice of de minimis risk management, on which risks that are deemed
to be suitably low are ignored (see Comar, 1979, Mumpower, 1986, for critical discus-
sion, see Peterson, 2002). More precisely, de minimis risk management involves ranking
adverse possibilities in terms of their risk and specifying a low, but non-zero, level of
risk to serve as the de minimis threshold. Those possibilities which fall below the thresh-
old are disregarded, while those which are above the threshold are subjected to a compre-
hensive risk analysis in order to determine whether measures should be taken to protect
against them. This approach may have been ﬁrst explicitly employed by the US Food
and Drug Administration in the 1960s, and is still widely used in the regulation of health
and environmental risks (see Peterson, 2002).
Suppose P and Q both fall below the de minimis risk threshold. If one disregards the
possibility of P and takes no measures against it, and disregards the possibility of Q and
Figure 1. Survey Response of 105 subjects listing the number of respondents judging
preference for (Bomb 1), preference for (Bomb 2), or no preference (left) and providing
comparative risk judgments about the two scenarios (right).
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takes no measures against it, then one has in effect disregarded the possibility of P ∨ Q
and taken no measures against it. But, unless checklist reasoning is valid, there is no
guarantee that the risk of P ∨ Q is below the de minimis level. Consider again the above
example. Suppose the risk of a car breakdown and of a trafﬁc jam are both reckoned to
be below the de minimis threshold. On the de minimis approach, both of these possibili-
ties are disregarded and no measures are taken against them. Since these are the only
ways in which you could be late for the meeting, no measures are taken against this pos-
sibility. And yet, if checklist reasoning fails, then the risk that you will be late for the
meeting may well be above the de minimis level, in which case the de minimis approach
recommends that we do take measures against it, or at least seriously consider the option
of doing so. Hence, without the validity of checklist reasoning, it is doubtful that this
approach to risk management is coherent.10
Another setting in which checklist reasoning seems to play a normative role is in the
context of legal fact-ﬁnding. Many of the rules of criminal procedure are designed to
minimise the risk of convicting an innocent person. The high standard of proof for crimi-
nal trials–beyond reasonable doubt–is intended to ensure that a defendant cannot be con-
victed unless the risk that he or she is innocent, given the presented evidence, is very
low. And yet, most criminal charges will involve a number of essential elements, and the
established legal practice is to apply the standard separately to each element (see, for
example, Allen & Jehl 2004, Allen 2008, Spottswood 2016).
For instance, to be guilty of theft, in many jurisdictions, a defendant must have:
i) taken property from the rightful owner.
ii) intended to permanently deprive the owner of that property.
iii) lacked the owner’s permission.
A defendant will be innocent of theft if any one of these conditions is not met. Under
prevailing legal practice, a defendant will be convicted if each of these conditions is
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But this merely ensures that there is a low risk that (i)
the defendant did not take property from the rightful owner, there is a low risk that (ii)
the defendant did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of that property, and there
is a low risk that (iii) the defendant had the owner’s permission. To conclude from this
that there is a low risk that the defendant is in fact innocent of the crime requires check-
list reasoning.
On the probabilistic account of risk, however, checklist reasoning is an invalid infer-
ence pattern. The probability of P ∨ Q can be higher than both the probability of P and
the probability of Q.11 If I roll a fair die, the probability that I will roll a 6 is ⅙ and the
probability that I will roll a 5 is ⅙. The probability that I will roll either a 5 or a 6 is ⅓.
10 Checklist reasoning may also be implicit in the practice of calculating risk scores–widely used in IT,
medical, or transport contexts–by summing (weighted) scores for individual risk factors. In particular, a
commitment to checklist reasoning may be evident for scoring systems in which risk factors can receive
a score of 0 when the risk is deemed to be suitably low. Of course, other systems for calculating risk
scores don’t have this feature. For a critical discussion of the use of risk scores in risk management, see
(Hubbard 2009). For an example of a risk matrix that appears to capture something approaching checklist
reasoning in the context of IT security, see (Open Group Standard, 2013, p.26)–a document whose aim
is to “provide a set of standards for various aspects of information security risk analysis” (op.cit., p.1).
11 Probability is additive, which is to say that, if P and Q are incompatible propositions, Pr(P ∨ Q) = Pr(P)
+ Pr(Q). More generally, for any P and Q, Pr(P ∨ Q) = Pr(P) + Pr(Q) - Pr(P ∧ Q).
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According to the probabilistic account of risk, even if the risk of P is low and the risk of
Q is low, it needn’t follow that the risk of P ∨ Q is low.
Here then are two established practices which are arguably at odds with the probabilis-
tic account of risk. Importantly, we don’t mean to suppose that such practices are beyond
criticism–indeed, we are open to the idea that they may need reform. It seems to us,
however, that the existence of these practices provides good motivation to consider other
notions of risk that may make different predictions about checklist reasoning. We will
turn to such a notion in what follows.
4. The modal account of risk
As mentioned above, Pritchard uses the Bomb example not merely to put pressure on the
probabilistic account of risk, but to motivate an alternative which he terms the modal
account of risk. In spite of the odds against it, the triggering event in (Bomb 1) is,
according to Pritchard, something that could easily happen–all that is needed is for a few
coloured balls to fall in the right way at the right time. In contrast, the triggering condi-
tions in (Bomb 2) all seem to be very far-fetched–it couldn’t easily happen that the weak-
est horse in the Grand National wins by at least 10 furlongs or that the worst team
remaining in the FA cup draw beats the best team remaining by at least 10 goals or that
the Queen spontaneously chooses to speak a complete sentence of Polish during her next
public speech (or so we would tend to think).
One way to formalise the idea of easy possibility is by appealing to an ordering of
possible worlds reﬂecting how similar they are to the actual world–an idea familiar to
philosophers since Lewis (1973, 1979). The degree of similarity of another world is
determined by how much would need to change about the actual world in order to bring
it into conformity with the world in question (Pritchard, 2015, p. 443f). As Pritchard
points out, very little would need to change in order for a set of six numbers to come up
in the next national lottery draw–all that is required is that six coloured balls fall in a par-
ticular conﬁguration. Thus, there is a very similar or close world in which this obtains.
More generally, it seems that any lottery outcome could obtain as easily as any other.
Amongst the most similar worlds in which the lottery is run will be worlds in which each
outcome obtains, including those which feature the six speciﬁed numbers. In contrast to
this, a great deal would need to change (so we might suppose) in order for the weakest
horse in the Grand National to win by at least 10 furlongs or the worst team in the FA
cup draw to beat the best team by at least 10 goals or the Queen to choose to speak a
complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech. As such, the most similar
worlds in which these events occur are very dissimilar or distant worlds.
According to the modal account of risk, the risk of a proposition P is determined by
the similarity of the most similar worlds in which P is true: the more similar these
worlds, the higher the risk. On this view, the risk of P is higher than the risk of Q just in
case the most similar worlds in which P is true are more similar than the most similar
worlds in which Q is true. Naturally, this world ordering should be restricted to worlds
in which the background evidence holds, and should exclude worlds which are inconsis-
tent with the background evidence.
As a result, on the modal account of risk (Bomb 1) and (Bomb 2) have very different
associated risks. The most similar worlds in which the bomb detonates in (Bomb 1) are
much closer to actuality than the most similar worlds in which the bomb detonates in
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(Bomb 2). Accordingly, the risk of the bomb detonating is higher in (Bomb 1) than
(Bomb 2), despite the probabilities being the same in both cases.
While Pritchard doesn’t make this point, it is interesting to observe that the modal
account does validate checklist reasoning. Any world in which P ∨ Q is true is either a
world in which P is true or a world in which Q true. As such, the most similar worlds in
which P ∨ Q is true will either be the most similar worlds in which P is true, or the most
similar worlds in which Q is true, or a mixture of the two.12 Suppose again that I throw a
fair die. The most similar worlds in which I throw a 5 or a 6 cannot be more similar than the
most similar worlds in which I throw a 5 and more similar than the most similar worlds in
which I throw a 6. After all, any world in which I throw either a 5 or a 6 must be either a
world in which I throw a 5 or a world in which I throw a 6. On the modal account, therefore,
the risk of P ∨ Q cannot be higher than the risk of P and the risk of Q–it will, in fact, be
equal to the higher of these risks. Hence if, on the modal account, the risk of P is low and
the risk of Q is low, it follows that the risk of P ∨ Q is low–just as required by checklist
reasoning.
Although it has a number of intriguing features, the modal account of risk faces a dif-
ﬁculty which raises questions as to whether it can play one of the fundamental roles that
we require from a notion of risk. One thing we can immediately observe is that no world
counts as more similar to the actual world than it is to itself. It follows that, on the modal
account, any event which actually happens must be at maximally high risk of happening,
and any state of affairs which actually obtains must be at maximally high risk of obtain-
ing. To put the point slightly differently, if P is true, it follows that P could easily be
true–it is contradictory to say “P is true but P couldn’t easily be true”. If P is true, then
there is a maximally similar world–the actual world–at which P is true, in which case,
according to the modal account, there is then a maximal risk of P.
This, we submit, can give rise to a potentially serious concern about the modal notion
of risk. Suppose one is about to drill into a wall in a West Australian house built in the
1970s, and is wondering about the risk that the wall contains asbestos. On the modal
account, if the wall really does contain asbestos, then the risk is maximally high. In this
case, there is a maximally similar world–the actual world–in which the wall contains
asbestos. If, on the other hand, the wall does not contain asbestos, then, according to the
modal account, the risk will be lower–the closest worlds in which this is true will be
somewhat distant from actuality, depending upon further facts of the case. In any event,
on the modal account it seems that one cannot make a judgment about the risk that the
wall contains asbestos without taking a view as to whether it does contain asbestos.
Similarly, consider again the example of jurors in a criminal trial who are contemplating
a guilty verdict and reasoning about the risk that the defendant is innocent. Suppose the
prosecution produced two independent eyewitnesses to the crime who were willing to iden-
tify the defendant as the culprit. What is the risk that the defendant is innocent–that he did
not commit the crime–given the testimonial evidence? If the defendant did commit the
crime, and the eyewitnesses are reliable and truthful, then the modal account predicts that
12 If we impose what Lewis termed the limit assumption for world similarity, stating that any set of worlds
must have maximally similar members, then each world could be assigned a similarity ‘rank’–the most
similar worlds will be assigned rank 0, the next most similar assigned rank 1 etc. (see Lewis, 1973,
Smith, 2016, chap. 8) A proposition P could also be assigned a similarity rank s(P) according to the rank
of the most similar worlds in which it is true. A lower rank will, on the modal account, indicate a higher
risk.
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the risk is low. In this case, the most similar worlds in which the defendant is innocent will
be very dissimilar–not only will the facts of the case be different in these worlds, but the
eyewitnesses will be lying or mistaken. What if, on the other hand, the defendant is in fact
innocent, and the eyewitnesses are lying or mistaken? In this case, on the modal account,
the risk that the defendant is innocent given the testimony, is maximally high. After all, in
this case, the most similar world in which the defendant is innocent is the actual world.13
Again, on the modal account, it seems that one cannot assess the risk that the defen-
dant is innocent without already taking a stand on whether he is innocent or guilty: if he
is guilty, the risk is low and if he is innocent the risk is maximally high. This seems to
be of little help when it comes to actually making a decision (for related discussion see
Smith, 2018, pp. 1204-1205).14
Importantly, this issue also affects Pritchard’s reasoning about the Bomb scenarios
above. His reasoning about these scenarios effectively takes it for granted that the trigger-
ing conditions in (Bomb2) are not met–namely, that the weakest horse in the Grand
National won’t win the race by at least ten furlongs, and the worst team in the FA Cup
draw won’t beat the best team by at least ten goals, and the Queen won’t choose to speak
a complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech. If we were in a world in
which the triggering conditions in (Bomb 2) are met, the modal account would predict
that the risk in (Bomb 2) is at least as high as the risk in (Bomb 1) or even higher.
A proponent of the modal account could point out that there are some cases in which one
can judge a proposition P to be high risk without the need to take a view on whether P is
true. In (Bomb 1), for instance, the modal account does allow us to judge that there is a high
risk that, say, (14, 6, 32, 20, 12, 41) will be the winning numbers, while remaining neutral
on whether they will be the winning numbers. Irrespective of whether these numbers come
up in the actual world, we know that there is a very similar world in which they do. While
this much should be granted, it remains the case that if the modal account is correct, then
one cannot judge that there is a low risk of P without thereby presupposing that P is false.
Of course, even if P is actually true, one could still, on the modal account, be in an
evidential position in which it is reasonable to judge that there is a low risk of P. That
is, a defender of the modal account could insist that, even if the wall does contain asbes-
tos or the defendant is innocent, one could still reasonably judge these propositions to be
low risk. Importantly, however, on the modal account, these judgments could never be
true–and this is in stark contrast to what the probabilistic account predicts. On the proba-
bilistic account, the risk that the wall contains asbestos or the risk that the defendant is
innocent, is purely a function of the available evidence, and does not depend on whether
the wall actually contains asbestos, or whether the defendant is actually innocent. Now,
while the jury is still out on whether the modal account can deal with this difﬁculty in a
13 Another possibility is that the eyewitnesses are lying or making some mistake, but the defendant is guilty
nonetheless. Depending on just how the details are ﬁlled in, the modal account may predict that there is
a somewhat higher risk of innocence in this case, as fewer facts would need to be altered in order to
reach worlds at which the defendant is innocent.
14 According to Pritchard, the modal account of risk is the ﬂipside of his modal account of luck, on which
the luckiness of an event or state of affairs is gauged by the similarity of the most similar worlds in
which it fails to obtain (see Pritchard, 2016, section II). When one assesses the luckiness of an event or
state of affairs one typically presupposes that the event has occurred or the state of affairs obtains (in this
sense risk judgments are importantly different to luck judgments). As such, the fact that the actual world
counts as maximally similar poses less of a problem for a modal account of luck.
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satisfying manner, we think there is an alternative notion of risk that can reproduce some
of the beneﬁts of the modal account without facing this particular problem.
5. The normic account of risk
Given a possible proposition, one question we can consider is how probable it is that the
proposition is true. Another question we might consider is how easy or difﬁcult it would
be for that proposition to be true. As the preceding discussion illustrates, our answer to
the second question is not determined by our answer to the ﬁrst. We might judge that the
bomb could more easily explode in (Bomb 1) than (Bomb 2) even though the probabili-
ties of an explosion are equal. A third question that we might consider is how normal or
abnormal it would be for a proposition to be true. It is somewhat natural to judge that it
would be more abnormal for the bomb to detonate in (Bomb 2) than in (Bomb 1), even
though the probabilities are equal. Although it might be highly unlikely for a particular
set of 6 numbers–say (14, 6, 32, 20, 12, 41)–to come up in the next National Lottery
draw, there is a sense in which there would be nothing abnormal about this occurrence.
After all, some set of six numbers has to come up, and it may just as well be this as any
other. In contrast, it would be highly abnormal for the weakest horse in the Grand
National to win the race by at least ten furlongs, and the worst team in the FA Cup draw
to beat the best team by at least ten goals, and the Queen to choose to speak a complete
sentence of Polish during her next public speech.
But what exactly is this notion of normalcy which is being appealed to here? Sometimes
when we describe an event as abnormal we mean only that it is relatively rare or infrequent.
In this sense, of course, it would count as abnormal for (14, 6, 32, 20, 12, 41) to be the num-
bers that come up in the National Lottery draw (and any other outcome would count as
abnormal too). Other times, though, when we describe a situation as abnormal, we are not
merely making a claim about frequencies. If the lights in my house suddenly start to ﬂicker,
or my car fails to start when I turn my key in the ignition and I remark “that’s not normal”,
I’m not simply pointing out that this is something infrequent–part of what I’m suggesting is
that there needs to be some speciﬁc explanation for what is occurring. Perhaps there’s a
problem with the electricity supply or the wiring in my house, perhaps the car battery is
dead or has been disconnected, etc. Whatever the truth, there has to be more to the story–
and this is what we ﬂag in characterising these events as abnormal.
It may be highly unlikely for (14, 6, 32, 20, 12, 41) to be the numbers that come up
in the National Lottery draw, but this wouldn’t require a special explanation of any
kind–all the lottery outcomes are on an explanatory par. On the other hand, it’s natural
to think that the triggering conditions in (Bomb 2)–the weakest horse winning the Grand
National by at least ten furlongs, the worst team in the FA Cup draw beating the best
team by at least ten goals, and the Queen choosing to speak a complete sentence of Pol-
ish during her next public speech, are each events that would require explanation.
As well as ordering possible worlds with respect to how similar they are, we may also
order possible worlds with respect to how normal they are, with the normalcy of a
proposition linked to the normalcy of the most normal worlds in which it is true (Smith,
2010, 2016). Amongst the most normal worlds in which the lottery takes place will be
worlds in which each possible set of numbers comes up, including those that will trigger
an explosion in (Bomb 1). In contrast, the most normal worlds in which the trigger con-
ditions of (Bomb 2) are met are highly abnormal.
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According to the normic account of risk, the risk of a proposition P is determined by the
normalcy of the most normal worlds in which P is true–the more normal these worlds, the
higher the risk. On this view, the risk of P is higher than the risk of Q just in case the most
normal worlds in which P is true are more normal than the most normal worlds in which Q
is true. Once again, this world ordering should be restricted to worlds in which the back-
ground evidence holds, and should exclude worlds which are inconsistent with the back-
ground evidence. According to the normic account, the risk of the bomb detonating is
higher in (Bomb 1) than (Bomb 2), despite the probabilities being the same in both cases.
The most normal worlds in which the bomb detonates in (Bomb 1) are more normal than
the most normal worlds in which the bomb detonates in (Bomb 2).
While the normic account and the modal account may make the same prediction about
the bomb examples, there are a number of signiﬁcant differences between the two
accounts. First and foremost, while the actual world must be maximal in a world similar-
ity ordering, the same is not true of a world normalcy ordering. While the actual world
must count as maximally similar to itself, it will not count as maximally normal–after all,
the actual world is witness to any number of abnormal events and states of affairs. Put
differently, truth does not entail normalcy and there is nothing contradictory in saying ‘P
is true but P wouldn’t normally be true’.
As a result, like the probabilistic account, the normic account of risk makes it per-
fectly possible to assess the risk of a proposition without taking a prior view on its truth.
Unlike the probabilistic account, however, the normic account validates checklist reason-
ing. Any world in which P ∨ Q is true is either a world in which P is true or a world in
which Q true. As such, the most normal worlds in which P ∨ Q is true will either be the
most normal worlds in which P is true, or the most normal worlds in which Q is true, or
a mixture of the two.15 The most normal worlds in which I throw a 5 or a 6 cannot be
more normal than the most normal worlds in which I throw a 5 and more normal than
the most normal worlds in which I throw a 6. Any world in which I throw either a 5 or
a 6 must be either a world in which I throw a 5 or a world in which I throw a 6. On the
normic account, the risk of P ∨ Q will be equal to the maximum of the risk of P and the
risk of Q. Hence, on the normic account, if the risk of P is low and the risk of Q is low,
it follows that the risk of P ∨ Q is low. The validation of checklist reasoning is a by-pro-
duct of linking the risk of a proposition P to the highest position, in an ordering, of
worlds in which P is true. Making the actual world maximal in this ordering is irrelevant
for this purpose.
Previously, we alluded to the availability heuristic as a potential explanation for why a
subject might judge the risk in (Bomb 1) to be greater than that in (Bomb 2). Originally,
a subject was said to use the heuristic “whenever he estimates the frequency or probabil-
ity by the ease with which instances or associations come to mind.” (Tversky & Kahne-
man 1973, p.208) The description of this heuristic has since become somewhat broader
(Schwarz & Vaughn 2002) and is often taken to encompass “ease of imagination” as a
15 If we impose a limit assumption for world normalcy, then each world could be assigned a normalcy rank
– the most normal worlds receiving rank 0, the next most normal receiving rank 1 and so on (Smith,
2018, chap. 8). A proposition P could also be assigned a normalcy rank n(P) according to the rank of the
most normal worlds in which it is true. A lower normalcy rank will indicate, on the normic account, a
higher risk.
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basis for judging risk–another phenomenon that has been experimentally demonstrated
(Sherman, et.al. 1985).
Importantly, one who uses ease of imagining as a way of making risk judgments
might be expected to conform to checklist reasoning. In order to imagine a situation in
which P ∨ Q holds one must either imagine a situation in which P holds or a situation in
which Q holds. The ease with which one can imagine P ∨ Q would in general be equal
to the ease with which one can imagine P or the ease with which one can imagine Q–
whichever one ﬁnds easier. If one judges that P is low risk, on the grounds that it is difﬁ-
cult to imagine, and judges that Q is low risk, on the grounds that it is difﬁcult to imag-
ine, one would be expected to make the very same judgment about P ∨ Q.
It is prima facie plausible that there is a connection between the amount of explanation
that an event or state of affairs would require, and the ease with which it can be imag-
ined. What makes it comparatively difﬁcult to imagine the weakest horse in the Grand
National winning by at least 10 furlongs, and the worst team in the FA cup draw beating
the best team by at least 10 goals, and the Queen choosing to speak a complete sentence
of Polish during her next public speech is that these scenarios require some explanation
and, as such, there is pressure to imagine a rich accompanying narrative in order to make
them intelligible. In contrast, no explanation is needed in order for six particular numbers
to come up in the next national lottery draw, and no imagined narrative is needed to sup-
plement our imagination of this event–as Pritchard might say, we need only imagine a
few coloured balls falling in a particular conﬁguration.
Indeed, some psychologists have drawn an explicit link between the ease with which a
hypothetical event or state of affairs can be imagined and the ease with which it can be
explained (Sherman et al. 1985).16 In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that
asking subjects to imagine a hypothetical event or state of affairs and asking subjects to
offer possible explanations for a hypothetical event or state of affairs have a similar effect
upon their subsequent judgments about its probability or risk (Koehler, 1991).17 This
raises the possibility of rethinking the role of the availability heuristic with respect to risk
judgments. Rather than regarding it as an expedient, but potentially misleading, method
for assessing probabilistic risk, ease of imagining could be seen as the canonical method
for assessing risk of a different kind–namely, normic risk. We will return to this in the
next section.
We have argued that the normic account of risk is able to emulate the purported
advantages of the modal account while avoiding what we take to be its most serious dif-
ﬁculty. The normic account is not free of difﬁculties however, and we conclude this sec-
tion by highlighting one–a problem that it shares with the modal account. The cases
described in Pritchard’s thought experiment demonstrate that the modal and the normic
accounts of risk can discriminate between the riskiness of propositions that the
16 Others have drawn a more general link between the availability of a hypothetical scenario and its nor-
malcy, construed in terms of its conformity to norms or routines (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). How this
conception of normalcy relates to the present conception is something we leave for possible future work.
17 We can distinguish between imagining an event or state of affairs in the sense of simply picturing or
visualising it, and imagining an event or state of affairs in the sense of envisaging how and why it could
occur or obtain. It is only ease of imagining in the second sense which is linked to the ease with which a
hypothetical event could be explained. Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest that it is only ease
of imagining in the second sense which is involved in the availability heuristic, with ease of sheer visual-
isation having no discernible effect on probability or risk judgments (Levi & Pryor, 1987).
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probabilistic account reckons to be equally risky. But it is also possible for the proba-
bilistic account to discriminate between the riskiness of propositions that the normic and
modal accounts reckon to be equally risky. Consider the following new scenario:
(Bomb 3) An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb, which he has hidden in a popu-
lated area. If the bomb explodes, many people will die. There is no way of discovering
the bomb before the time it is set to detonate. The bomb will only detonate, however, if
six speciﬁc numbers between 1 and 99 come up on the next national lottery draw. The
odds of these six numbers appearing is roughly one billion to one. It is not possible to
interfere with this lottery draw.
In (Bomb 3) the odds are very strongly against the bomb detonating–more strongly than
in (Bomb 1). As such, the probabilistic account predicts that (Bomb 1) is the riskier sce-
nario. It is unclear, however, whether either the modal or the normic account can accom-
modate this intuitive difference in risk. Pritchard’s comments about (Bomb 1) would
seem to carry over to (Bomb 3)–all that is required for the bomb to detonate is for six
coloured balls to fall in a particular conﬁguration. Any lottery outcome could obtain as
easily as any other. Amongst the most similar worlds in which the lottery is run will be
worlds in which each outcome obtains, including those which feature the six speciﬁed
numbers. According to the modal account, the risk of an explosion in (Bomb 3) should
be equal to the risk of an explosion in (Bomb 1).18
The normic account makes the same prediction. For six particular numbers to come up in
a lottery draw requires no special explanation. All of the lottery outcomes are on an
explanatory par. Amongst the most normal worlds in which the (Bomb 3) lottery is run will
be worlds in which each outcome obtains, including those which feature the six speciﬁed
numbers. Since the modal and normic accounts predict that (Bomb 3) and (Bomb 1) are
equally risky, they will also predict that (Bomb 3) is riskier than (Bomb 2), even though the
probability of the bomb detonating in (Bomb 3) is signiﬁcantly lower. In this case, it seems
questionable whether the prediction made by the modal and normic accounts is the correct
one.19 Whatever we might take its beneﬁts to be, we think it is clear that the normic account
is incapable of providing everything that we require from a notion of risk.
6. Varieties of risk
We have set out three competing accounts of risk–the probabilistic, modal and normic
accounts. All three of these accounts represent what we might term monist conceptions
18 We could alter the triggering condition in (Bomb 3) in such a way that only ﬁve numbers are involved
in the lottery. This would leave the probability of an explosion lower in (Bomb 3) than (Bomb 1) but
would arguably, bring it modally closer–as only ﬁve balls would need to fall at a particular time in order
for the bomb to detonate. In this case the modal account (though not the normic account) would make
the even more counterintuitive prediction that (Bomb 3) is riskier than (Bomb 1) in spite of the lower
probability of an explosion. We plan to discuss this and other decision-theoretic concerns for the modal
and normic accounts in further work.
19 Even if one wished to dispute whether the triggering conditions in (Bomb 2) are more modally distant or
more abnormal than the triggering conditions in (Bomb 3), the intended structure of this example is
clearly a possible one. As Pritchard points out, there are events with arbitrarily low probabilities that
occur at very similar worlds (Pritchard, 2015, section 4)–and the same is true of maximally normal
worlds. As such, there are events with arbitrarily low probabilities that the modal account and normic
account will reckon to be more risky than the triggering conditions in (Bomb 2).
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of risk. That is, all three accounts agree that there is one correct notion of risk and dis-
agree on how best to analyse or characterise that notion.
Given the monist assumption, a defender of the probabilistic account is forced to appeal
to a range of heuristics and biases in order to explain why intuitive judgments can systemati-
cally deviate from those that the account predicts to be correct. If someone uses, say, ease
of imagining as a way of making a risk judgment, this is portrayed as a kind of mental short-
cut, which is employed because it can, under the right circumstances, serve as a reliable
guide to risk, probabilistically construed. When this method leads to risk judgments that are
at variance with what the probabilistic account predicts, this is taken to show that the
method can systematically mislead. When confronted with the practice of using checklist
reasoning, a defender of the probabilistic account of risk must adopt either a revisionary
approach, arguing that the relevant practices should be changed and the reasoning aban-
doned, or attempt to explain, from within the conﬁnes of the probabilistic perspective, why
the use of such reasoning may be useful or acceptable, though strictly invalid.20
Similar issues arise for other monist views. A proponent of the normic account may
highlight the fact that it validates checklist reasoning and is able to legitimise the prac-
tices that employ it. Additionally, she may be able to account for some intuitive differ-
ences in risk that cannot be accommodated from a probabilistic perspective. And yet, as
discussed in the previous section, the normic account is also insensitive to certain intu-
itive differences in risk, such as that between (Bomb 1) and (Bomb 3), which can be
straightforwardly captured by the probabilistic account.
Rather than attempting to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of competing monist accounts
of risk, an intriguing alternative is to embrace a pluralist view on which there are multi-
ple, equally legitimate, notions of risk. While we won’t attempt a full elaboration or
defence of risk pluralism, in what follows we sketch the bare bones of such a view and
note possible avenues for future research. On the kind of pluralist view that we wish to
consider, the probabilistic and normic accounts represent two distinct precisiﬁcations of
our ordinary, intuitive notion of risk, each emphasising or picking up on different aspects
of that notion. While we remain open to the possibility of further viable notions of risk,
it is not our intent that such notions proliferate. In our view, the preceding criticisms of
the modal notion of risk show, for instance, that it cannot serve as a viable precisiﬁcation
of our intuitive notion.21
A pluralist view of this kind invites a rethinking of the status of certain heuristics
and biases involved in making risk judgments. On a monist view, if we observe two
different conﬂicting methods for making risk judgments, we are forced to conclude
that one of these (at least) represents a heuristic which is leading us astray. On a plu-
ralist view, while it is still possible for risk judgments to be affected by heuristics
and biases, we cannot automatically conclude that heuristics are at play whenever we
20 So, for example, one could argue that in many cases of checklist reasoning the probability of the dis-
juncts is so low as to leave the probability of the disjunction below the threshold for low risk. Compare
in this context Christensen (2004, p.79f) discussion of the argument.
21 Pluralism about risk is also suggested by Bricker (2018) who argues that ordinary risk judgments can
“track different metrics given different initial conditions” (p.207, n2) (for related discussion, see also
Ebert & Robertson (2013, p.55f.)). This has an obvious afﬁnity with the view that we suggest here,
though Bricker, unlike us, appears to regard the modal account as providing one such metric and deliver-
ing one viable notion of risk. In this context, note that Chalmers (2011) suggests that pluralism about
philosophical notions–and risk clearly seems one such notion–should be the default position.
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observe conﬂicting methods for making such judgments–for it may be that the meth-
ods are tracking different kinds of risk, each of which can be extracted from our
ordinary notion.
Consider again the availability heuristic. On the monist probabilist view, to use “ease of
imagination” as a way of judging risk is to employ an expedient, but imperfect, method for
tracking probabilities. Given a pluralist outlook, however, this can be seen instead as an
appropriate method for tracking something non-probabilistic–normalcy–which is equally
present in our ordinary notion of risk. This also opens up a new perspective on the factors
which have been shown to exert an inﬂuence on risk judgments. For example, highlighting
the vividness of a bad outcome has been portrayed as a source of error in risk judgments, on
the grounds that it can lead people to ignore or downplay probabilistic information (Tversky
& Kahneman 1974). On the pluralist picture, rather than being something which clouds our
thinking about risk, vividness could simply serve to emphasise or foreground certain non-
probabilistic aspects of the ordinary notion of risk.
Of course, there are a number of substantial questions about how, on the view we
have outlined, we should think about the ordinary notion of risk and its relation to the
probabilistic and normic notions. One model is to regard the ordinary notion of risk as a
“defective” concept in the sense of Scharp (2013, forthcoming)–a concept constituted by
various principles which lead to inconsistent and conﬂicting results. In this case, the
probabilistic and normic notions of risk could be seen as consistent concepts which can
be extracted from the ordinary notion, and which could fruitfully replace it for a range of
purposes–in Scharp’s terms, they could be seen not as attempts at conceptual analysis,
but as the results of conceptual engineering (see also Cappelen, 2018). As said, more
research will be required properly to develop our preferred form of risk pluralism. We
conclude by highlighting three further consequences our distinctive approach will have
for current philosophical and psychological discussion regarding the notion of risk and
the rationality of human risk judgments.
First, let’s revisit our own survey regarding Pritchard’s bomb scenarios. While a signiﬁ-
cant proportion judge the two scenarios as equally risky–in line with the probabilistic
account–it is worth highlighting that roughly one in three subjects disagree and judge
(Bomb 2) to be less risky than (Bomb 1) as predicted by the normic account. For a monist
probabilist, one in three subjects exhibits a defective intuitive judgment which would need
to be explained away using heuristics and biases. For the pluralist, on the other hand, it
might be that some of these subjects are steered, by the very contents of the vignette, to rea-
son along the lines predicted by a normic notion of risk. This raises the important question
of how and when vignettes trigger such variation. Further research, controlling for alterna-
tive explanations of this phenomenon, promises to be an exciting research project. Ulti-
mately, such research may help us to determine more reliably when a normic or
probabilistic notion could offer a better prediction of human risk judgment.22
22 There is some evidence, partly alluded to above, suggesting that fact ﬁnders in legal trials don’t engage
in probabilistic reasoning but, rather, reach a verdict through comparing the plausibility of competing nar-
ratives (Pennington & Hastie, 1991, Allen & Jehl, 2004, Allen, 2008, Pardo & Allen, 2008, Allen, 2014,
section 4)–a process which could potentially be understood in terms of the management of normic risk.
We won’t pursue this further here. Certain pervasive judgments about lotteries–in particular, the judgment
that one cannot know that a particular ticket will lose, or that a particular set of numbers won’t come up,
purely on the basis of the odds involved–could be explained in terms of the fact that such a belief would
be subject to a high normic (though low probabilistic) risk of error. (Ebert, Smith and Durbach, 2018)
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Second, the pluralist approach could potentially be combined with the dual system
approach to human judgment about risk. Consider the suggestion by Loewenstein et al.
(2001) that there seem to be two systems involved in our risk judgment: an affective,
non-probabilistic system which is distinct from a cognitive probabilistic system. One pos-
sibility is to merge risk pluralism with a dual system approach, by portraying normic risk
and probabilistic risk as the notions tracked respectively by the affective and cognitive
systems (which may in turn involve a re-evaluation of the affective system as partly cog-
nitive). Whatever one thinks of the prospects for such a view, it is clear that research in
psychology regarding the role of anticipatory emotions (i.e. immediate visceral reactions
such as fear, anxiety and dread) when making risk judgments could potentially be
informed by the role that normalcy plays in judgment about risk.
Lastly, our discussion offers a new take on the so-called “rationality wars” in psychol-
ogy. In a number of publications, Gigerenzer and others have challenged Kahneman and
Tversky’s attitude of characterising various biases and heuristics as errors or fallacies,
rendering human judgment based on them irrational.23 In contrast, Gigerenzer suggests
that evaluating the performances of human judgment against the norm of an ideal proba-
bilistic reasoner is often inappropriate, since it fails to take into account the boundedness
of human judgment and rationality. We do not want to delve into the details of this dis-
pute, but it is important to note that it links up with one of our primary concerns here–
the question of whether a probabilistic norm supplies the “gold standard” for risk judg-
ments.
The pluralist conception of risk offers a different perspective on questions about the
rationality of risk judgments. According to the pluralist, there are different precisiﬁcations
of our intuitive notion of risk, each of which have their own normative standards which
will overlap in some cases but diverge in others. If subjects judge in a way that goes
against the standards of, say, the probabilistic account, this doesn’t necessarily render
their judgment irrational. After all, they may be judging in accordance with the standards
appropriate for the normic notion of risk.
There may be a sense in which this simply pushes the normative question one step
back. Even if we accept that there are competing normative standards associated with the
different notions of risk, we might ask whether these notions are always equally legiti-
mate, or whether there are contexts in which only one of them should be regarded as the
correct norm of reasoning and judgment. By adopting a pluralist view, we open up the
possibility of distinguishing two kinds of mistakes that are relevant to the debate about
the rationality of human risk judgments: the normative mistake of failing to meet the
demands of a given standard, and the meta-normative mistake of adhering to the wrong
standard in a given context. Addressing the meta-normative issue of which standard
ought to be in play, in a given context, will have to be postponed to another occasion.24
23 To be fair, this is only one aspect of Gigerenzer’s criticism, which is wide-ranging (see Gigerenzer &
Murray, 1987), (Gigerenzer 1991, 1994, 1996). For a response, see Kahneman & Tversky (1996). For
critical discussion of the normative criticism alluded to above and a list of other concerns levelled against
Kahneman, see Vranas (2000) with a response by Gigerenzer (2001) and Samuels et.al. (2002).
24 We would like to thank the audiences of the staff research seminar in philosophy at the University of
Stirling and the research seminar of the Behavioural Science Centre at the University of Stirling for their
feedback. In addition, we are extremely grateful to the reviewers for their extensive critical and support-
ive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Finally, we would like to acknowledge funding from
to the University of Stirling APC fund to cover the costs for open access publishing.
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Appendix: Survey recruitment, design, and results
We recruited participants for our surveys using proliﬁc.ac which is suggested to be
preferable to other platforms (Peer et.al 2017; Palan & Schitter 2018). Participants were
paid £0.30 per survey, resulting in an average pay of £9 per hour and so well above min-
imum wage in the UK. Given the speciﬁc content of the survey, we restricted participa-
tion to native English speakers and UK nationals. Participants were asked for personal
information (gender, age, university degree, philosophy background). In total, we
recruited 106 participants (72 female, 33, male, 1 other) and we deleted one participant
given his/her background in philosophy. We received ethical approval from the Univer-
sity of Stirling (GUEP355) for this study.
We used the following vignette which is almost identical to the text in Pritchard
(2015):
Background
An evil scientist has rigged up a large bomb, which he has hidden in a populated area.
If the bomb explodes, many people will die. There is no way of discovering the bomb
before the time it is set to detonate.
Scenario 1.
The bomb will only detonate if a certain set of numbers comes up in a lottery draw.
The odds of these numbers appearing is 1 in 14 Million. It is not possible to interfere
with this lottery draw.
Scenario 2.
The bomb will only detonate if a series of three highly unlikely events obtains. First,
the weakest horse in the ﬁeld at the Grand National, Lucky Loser, must win the race
by at least ten furlongs. Second, the worst team remaining in the FA Cup draw,
Accrington Stanley, must beat the best team remaining, Manchester United, by at least
ten goals. And third, the queen of England must spontaneously choose to speak a
complete sentence of Polish during her next public speech. The odds of this chain of
events occurring are 1 in 14 million. It is not possible to interfere with the outcomes
of any of the events in this chain.
We then asked participants about their choice preference:
Assuming you are amongst the population possibly affected by the bomb, do you:
a. prefer scenario 1 over scenario 2.
b. prefer scenario 2 over scenario 1.
c. have no clear preferences.
We then asked them about their risk judgment (both questions were visible to the sub-
jects):
Do you judge that:
a. there is an equal risk of the bomb detonating in both scenarios.
b. there is a higher risk of the bomb detonating in scenario 1 than scenario 2.
c. there is a higher risk of the bomb detonating in scenario 2 than in scenario 1.
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The results of our survey are as follows: (Figure 2) lists responses with respect to the
preference question.
While both scenarios have the same probability of occurring, scenario 2 is clearly pre-
ferred over scenario 1 or the no-preference option. Expressing a preference for scenario 2
was signiﬁcantly more popular than the other two options (v2 = 20.8, df = 2, p-value <
0.001).
However, when it comes to risk judgments (Figure 3), subjects tended to judge both
scenarios to be equally risky. This judgment was signiﬁcantly more popular than the
other options (v2 = 37.2, df = 2, p-value < 0.001).
We assessed people’s behaviour with respect to both their preference and risk judg-
ments (Figure 4). In our survey, we presented the preference and the risk question on the
same page and, while the preference question was listed before the risk question, both
questions were transparent to the subjects while responding to either. Assessing a sub-
ject’s risk judgment in light of their preference judgment offers some intriguing results.
Subjects who expressed no preference for either scenario were most likely to go with the
accompanying risk assessment and judge the two scenarios as equally risky (32 out of 33
Figure 2. Survey Response of 105 subjects listing the number of respondents judging
preference for (Scenario 1 over Scenario 2), preference for (Scenario 2 over Scenario 1),
or judging (No Preference).
Figure 3. Survey Response of 105 subjects listing the number of respondents judging
(Scenario 1 riskier than Scenario 2), (Scenario 2 riskier than Scenario 1), or judging
(Equal Risk)
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subjects did so). Strikingly, we do not ﬁnd this pattern for subjects who expressed a pref-
erence for one of the scenarios. Roughly 47% and 38% of those subjects who express a
preference for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively, still judged the scenarios to be
equally risky.
This observation challenges the assumption–arguably implicit in Pritchard’s discus-
sion–that in these cases risk judgments are determined or predicted by a subject’s prefer-
ence. Focusing on the subjects who express a preference for scenario 2 (55 in total), one
would expect, if this assumption were correct, to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant difference
between the number of people who made the accompanying risk judgment that scenario
1 is more risky, and the number who judged the scenarios to be equally risky. This, how-
ever, is not the case: v2 = 2.6667, df = 1, p-value = 0.1025. Similar considerations apply
to subjects who express a preference for scenario 1 (17 in total): v2 = 0, df = 1, p-value
= 1. However, since absence of statistical evidence does not imply the absence of an
effect, particularly with small sample sizes, caution is required when interpreting these
results.
It is worth highlighting that these ﬁndings complement observations made by Heath &
Tversky (1991) who showed that subjects with certain competences who judge scenarios
to be equally likely, may still express a distinct preference for a scenario. Further
research is planned to investigate why preference judgments and risk judgments appear
mismatched in some cases but not in others, and what other possible determinants there
are for risk and preference judgments.
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